The taxation of the returns on debt and equity in South Africa by Wortmann, Neil
 1 
The University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE TAXATION OF THE RETURNS ON DEBT AND 
EQUITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce 
(specialising in Taxation). 
 
Johannesburg, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neil Wortmann 
 2 
ABSTRACT 
 
The existing South African tax system only acknowledges debt financing through the 
deduction allowed for interest payments, as compared to equity financing where no 
such deduction is allowed for dividend payments. Taxpayers are prejudiced should 
they wish to use equity financing to fund a project or company. The deductibility of 
interest creates the incentive for taxpayers to use debt funding even when it may not 
be in the best interests of the company. This paper considers some of the 
complications of the different tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity. 
Alternative models including the comprehensive business income tax, an allowance 
for corporate equity and a deduction for dividends are considered in order to establish 
whether the taxation of the returns on debt and equity could be improved or simplified 
in South Africa. 
 
Key Words: debt, equity, hybrid instruments, tax deductibility, comprehensive 
business income tax, allowance for corporate equity, dividend deductibility, South 
Africa 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background 
 
Companies typically fund their operations through the issuance of debt or equity. The 
tax consequences of the returns on debt and equity are different. Interest (being the 
return on debt) is allowed as a deduction under section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962 (‘Income Tax Act’), whilst dividends (being the return on equity) are not 
eligible for the same corresponding deduction. Similarly, a creditor that earns interest 
on debt includes the interest in taxable income (subject to certain exemptions) whilst 
the dividends earned by a shareholder in relation to an equity investment are exempt 
from normal tax under section 10(1)(k) (subject to certain restrictions). Unless the 
context otherwise indicates, section numbers refer to the Income Tax Act. The 
analysis is limited to normal tax and does not consider the effect of dividends tax. The 
different tax treatment of the returns of debt and equity is likely to stem from the view 
that interest is a cost to a company whilst dividends are viewed as a distribution of 
remaining profits after all costs, including taxes, have been incurred.  
 
Debt and equity have different commercial features.  Debt has a senior creditor claim 
(compared to equity) in a company and typically yields a return in the form of 
interest. Equity is subordinated to debt and benefits from the residual profits and 
value in the company (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 2001). Debt is typically a 
lower risk instrument (compared to equity) that yields a more predictable but lower 
yielding return in the form of interest. Equity is typically a higher risk instrument 
(compared to debt) with more volatile and potentially higher returns in the form of 
capital appreciation and/or higher dividends. As equity benefits from the residual 
value of the company, profits that are not distributed as dividends should increase the 
value of the equity. Equity holders take on more business risk than debt holders. The 
value of equity is typically much more price sensitive to business risk factors and 
economic data insofar as it impacts on investors’ perception of future company 
profitability. The value of debt is less sensitive to these factors as a reduction in future 
profitability will typically not impact on the company’s ability to service the interest 
on its debt or redeem the principal debt at maturity. The price sensitivity of debt to a 
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company’s profitability should only apply in extreme cases where the credit 
fundamentals of a company are affected to such an extent that the debt holder expects 
to not have the principal amount of the debt repaid or interest paid. Whilst 
commercial differences between debt and equity exist, if one takes the view that both 
debt and equity are merely alternative forms of financing, then a different treatment of 
the returns on debt and equity becomes difficult to justify. This is particularly relevant 
where the distinction between debt and equity becomes difficult to determine, as is 
often the case with hybrid instruments where features of both debt and equity are 
prevalent. 
 
Whilst the legal nature and label of debt and equity normally dictates the tax 
consequences of the returns, the Income Tax Act incorporates specific sections to 
overcome perceived abuse of the tax base of the country and to tax instruments 
according to their true substance. Sections 8E, 8EA, 8F (as amended) and 8FA (as 
amended) serve to re-characterise the returns on debt and equity. Sections 23M 
(effective January 2015) and 23N serve to impose limitations on interest deductions 
particularly where the use of debt is deemed to be excessive. Section 24O, on the 
contrary, allows for interest deductions in circumstances that would not normally 
qualify in terms of the general deduction formula. The sections referred to in this 
paragraph are all required because of the different tax treatment of the returns on debt 
and equity. These sections include 1) key features of when the return on financial 
instruments should be treated as that applicable to debt or that applicable to equity, 2) 
when the use of debt or equity is deemed appropriate, and 3) when the deduction of 
interest from income should be allowed.  The different tax treatment of the returns on 
debt and equity, and the need to introduce the sections mentioned in this paragraph to 
address these concerns creates complexities in the tax system. 
 
It is the writer’s contention that these complexities may be avoided through an equal 
tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity. Three alternative proposals are 
considered. Two major reform proposals namely the comprehensive business income 
tax and the allowance for corporate equity have been developed internationally to deal 
with the different tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity. Whilst the 
comprehensive business income tax provides that neither a return on debt nor a return 
on equity may be deducted, the allowance for corporate equity provides for the 
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deduction of an imputed return on equity together with the existing deduction for 
interest on debt (Bond, 2000; Devereux and Freeman, 1991). The third alternative 
proposal for a tax system is one that allows for a deduction of dividends paid. The 
alternative tax systems will be reviewed in order to establish whether the taxation of 
the returns on debt and equity could be improved or simplified in South Africa. 
 
 
The Research Problem 
 
 
The Statement of the Problem:  
 
How could the taxation of the returns on debt and equity in South Africa be improved 
or simplified? 
 
The Sub-Problems 
 
The first sub-problem is to understand the commercial characteristics and legal nature 
of debt and equity. 
 
The second sub-problem addresses the tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity 
and the implications of the different tax treatment for companies and investors. The 
need to limit interest deductions from a company’s income and the reclassification of 
the returns on debt and equity is reviewed.  
 
The third sub-problem considers alternative proposals intended to remove the 
different tax treatment of the returns of debt and equity. The comprehensive business 
income tax and the allowance for corporate equity proposals will be considered in a 
South African context. A system that allows for a full deduction on dividends paid 
will also be considered as an alternative approach to taxing the returns on equity in 
South Africa. The three alternative models above will be investigated in order to 
assess whether South African tax legislation dealing with the returns on debt and 
equity can be improved or simplified. 
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Research Methodology 
 
 
The research follows a qualitative research methodology and consists of a review of 
international and South African literature and South African legislation. The literature 
review includes books, periodicals, government media releases, tax cases and online 
articles.  
 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 
The research is focused on South Africa but draws on international principles of debt 
and equity as determined by international statutes and courts. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The definitions and key commercial attributes of debt and equity 
 
Financial instruments can take the form of debt or equity. It is important to understand 
how each are defined and the commercial attributes of each.  
 
The National Treasury stated in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2012: 
Debt and share instruments have a number of differences in their features and their 
consequences. 
 In commercial terms, debt represents a claim on a specified stream of cash 
flows. In its purest form, this claim comes in the form of interest that is 
payable despite the financial performance of the debtor. Shares, on the other 
hand, represent a contingent claim by shareholders on dividends that are 
directly or indirectly based on company profits. 
 In tax terms, debt payments are typically deductible by the payer with the 
same payments being includible as income by the payee. Depending on the 
circumstances, a tax incentive may exist for a taxpayer to attach a label to a 
debt or a share instrument that differs from the underlying substance. 
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Debt: 
 
A debt is normally structured as a contractual relationship whereby a creditor agrees 
to advance an amount to a debtor. The terms of the agreement would typically 
stipulate an amount of interest payable to the creditor in order to provide the creditor 
with a return on the amount advanced. The debtor would be obligated to return the 
amount advanced (principle amount) at the contractual maturity date. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines debt as:  
That which is owed or due; anything (as money, goods, or service) which one person 
is under obligation to pay or render to another.  
 
The definition focuses on the obligation to repay an amount.  
 
The Income Tax Act does not have a definition for debt. The definition of financial 
instrument in section 1 is wide and incorporates the concept of both debt and equity: 
“financial instrument” includes— 
(a) a loan, advance, debt, bond, debenture, bill, share, promissory note, banker’s 
acceptance, negotiable certificate of deposit, deposit with a financial institution, a 
participatory interest in a portfolio of a collective investment scheme, or a similar 
instrument; 
 (b) any repurchase or resale agreement, forward purchase arrangement, forward sale 
arrangement, futures contract, option contract or swap contract; 
(c) any other contractual right or obligation the value of which is determined directly 
or indirectly with reference to— 
(i) a debt security or equity; 
(ii) any commodity as quoted on an exchange; or 
(iii) a rate index or a specified index; 
(d) any interest-bearing arrangement; and 
(e) any financial arrangement based on or determined with reference to the time value 
of money or cash flow or the exchange or transfer of an asset; 
 
Section 8E has a narrower definition of financial instrument and it is aligned to that of 
debt: 
“financial instrument” means any— 
(a) interest-bearing arrangement; or 
(b) financial arrangement based on or determined with reference to a specified rate of 
interest or the time value of money; 
 
The International Financial Reporting Standards defines a financial liability in IAS32 
as follows: 
A financial liability is any liability that is:  
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(a) a contractual obligation:  
(i) to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or  
(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity 
under conditions that are potentially unfavourable to the entity; or… 
 
The definitions above all make reference to the contractual obligation that one person 
has to another to repay an amount that is advanced by the creditor to a debtor. The 
Income Tax Act definitions include the concept of interest payable on the amount 
advanced. 
 
 
Equity: 
 
Section 1 in the Income Tax Act defines a share as follows:  
“share” means, in relation to any company, any unit into which the proprietary 
interest in that company is divided. 
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘Companies Act’) has a very similar definition for a 
share in chapter 1 as follows:  
“share” means one of the units into which the proprietary interest in a profit company 
is divided.  
 
The Income Tax Act also defines an equity share in section 1 as follows:  
“equity share” means any share in a company, excluding any share that, neither as 
respects dividends nor as respects returns of capital, carries any right to participate 
beyond a specified amount in a distribution; 
 
The definitions for equity lacks the obligation to return an amount as is found in the 
debt definitions and instead refers to the right to a proprietary interest or ownership of 
a company. An equity share goes further to exclude shares that have limitations on the 
dividend rights or return of capital of the share.  
 
Equity does not typically have contractual rights to dividends and any distributions 
are usually at the discretion of the board of directors. The board of directors of a 
company need to meet the solvency and liquidity requirements as set out in section 46 
of the Companies Act in order to make a distribution. Debt has a contractual claim 
against a company as compared to equity which benefits from the residual interest in 
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the company. Debt has a senior ranking claim when compared to equity in terms of 
the Insolvency Act, 1936. 
 
 
Commercial constituents of debt and equity: 
 
Further to the definitions of debt and equity, it is also important to understand the 
commercial constituents of debt and equity. In the writer’s opinion, the key 
commercial differences between debt and equity are 1) a factor of risk, 2) the tenor of 
the instrument, and 3) the rights to ownership and control of the company. Debt has a 
senior claim in  a company (compared to equity) and offers no strategic bearing on the 
operations of the business, unless an event of default occurs. A debt provider has the 
right of repayment of the capital advanced and expects to receive an interest rate 
commensurate with the credit risk of the debt instrument. Debt holders receive no 
further right to participate in the profits of the company beyond this. Equity has rights 
to the residual profits and value of a company. Equity is of a perpetual nature and 
does not have rights of repayment on the capital advanced. Equity has no contractual 
rights to distributions as these are subject to the discretion of the board of directors as 
set out in section 46 of the Companies Act. Equity has a proprietary interest in a 
company, has voting rights and a level of control over the company. 
 
Financial instruments that contain features of both debt and equity are common. The 
classification of such instruments as either debt or equity is not an easy task. Hefer JA 
said in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR that ‘the courts will not be 
deceived by the form of a transaction: it will rend aside the veil in which it is wrapped 
and examine the true nature and substance’. The true nature and substance of debt and 
equity should be considered in this context. There are international cases that deal 
with determining whether a financial instrument constitutes debt or equity and are 
helpful in determining the commercial attributes of debt and equity. In Pepsico Puerto 
Rico Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-269 (2012), the United States Tax Court 
was asked to consider whether certain advance agreements issued were more 
appropriately characterised as debt than as equity. The judgment relied on 13 factors 
(the ‘Dixie Dairy Factors’) that have developed over time in case law and were 
described in Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner.  
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The Dixie Dairy Factors are described below: 
1. Name or label:  
‘The issuance of a stock certificate indicates an equity contribution; the 
issuance of a bond, debenture, or note is indicative of a bona fide 
indebtedness.’ Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d at 1412, as cited in 
Dixie Dairies. 
2. Fixed maturity date:  
‘The presence of a fixed maturity date indicates a fixed obligation to 
repay, a characteristic of a debt obligation. The absence of the same on the 
other hand would indicate that repayment was in some way tied to the 
fortunes of the business, indicative of an equity advance.’ Estate of Mixon, 
464 F.2d at 404, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
3. Source of payments:  
‘If repayment is possible only out of corporate earnings, the transaction 
has the appearance of a contribution of equity capital but if repayment is 
not dependent upon earnings, the transaction reflects a loan to the 
corporation.’ Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 287-288, as 
cited in Dixie Dairies.  
4. Right to enforce payments:  
‘A definite obligation to repay an advance, including interest thereon, 
suggests a loan obligation.’ Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo 1998- 232, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
5. Participation in management as a result of the advances:  
‘The right of the entity advancing funds to participate in the management 
of the receiving entity’s business demonstrates that the advance may not 
have been bona fide debt and instead was intended as an equity 
investment.’ Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 579, 603 (1991), as 
cited in Dixie Dairies. 
6. Status in relation to regular corporate creditors:  
‘Whether an advance is subordinated to obligations to other creditors bears 
on whether the taxpayer advancing the funds was acting as a creditor or an 
investor.’ Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 406, as cited in Dixie Dairies.  
7. Intent of the parties:  
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‘It is relevant whether the parties intended, at the time of the issuance of 
the debentures, to create a debtor-creditor relationship. The intent of the 
parties, in turn, may be reflected by their subsequent acts; the manner in 
which the parties treat the instruments is relevant in determining their 
character.’ A.R. Lantz Co., 424 F.2d at 1333 (citing Taft v. Commissioner, 
314 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1963), as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
8. Identity of interest between creditor and stockholder:  
‘If advances are made by stockholders in proportion to their respective 
stock ownership, an equity capital contribution is indicated.’ Estate of 
Mixon, 464 F.2d at 409; Monon R.R. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. at 358), as 
cited in Dixie Dairies. 
9. Thinness of capital structure in relation to debt:  
‘The purpose of examining the debt-to-equity ratio in characterising an 
advance is to determine whether a corporation is so thinly capitalised that 
repayment would be unlikely.’ CMA Consol Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2005-16, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
10. Ability of corporation to obtain credit from outside sources:  
‘The touchstone of economic reality is whether an outside lender would 
have made the payments in the same form and on the same terms.’ Segel v. 
Commissioner, 89 T.C. at 828, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
11. Use to which advances were put:  
‘Where a corporation uses an advance of funds to acquire capital assets, 
the advance is more likely to be characterised as equity. Use of advances 
to meet the daily operating needs of the corporation, rather than to 
purchase capital assets, is indicative of bona fide indebtedness.’ Estate of 
Mixon, 464 F.2d at 410, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
12. Failure of the debtor to repay:  
‘The repayment of an advance may support its characterisation as bona 
fide indebtedness.’ Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 410, as cited in Dixie 
Dairies. 
13. Risk involved in making advances:  
‘A significant consideration in our inquiry is “whether the funds were 
advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment regardless of the 
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success of the venture or were placed at the risk of the business.’ Gilbert v. 
Commissioner, 248 F.2d at 406, as cited in Dixie Dairies. 
 
The court in Dixie Dairies noted that each factor is not equally significant, that no 
single factor is determinative and that not all of the factors are relevant to each case. 
Pepsico Puerto Rico goes further to say that ‘The focus of a debt-versus-equity 
inquiry generally narrows to whether there was an intent to create a debt with a 
reasonable expectation of repayment and, if so, whether that intent comports with the 
economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor relationship’ (Fin Hay Realty Co. v. 
United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968), as cited in Pepsico Puerto Rico).  
 
Dixie Dairies makes it clear that the determination of financial instruments as debt or 
equity is complex, depends on many factors and the surrounding factors to each case. 
It is often the intention of the taxpayer that needs to be assessed in order to determine 
whether a true debtor-creditor relationship was intended or rather an equity 
contribution in order to benefit from the profits and value of a company. A key 
commercial attribute of debt raised by Pepsico Puerto Rico is the repayment of the 
advance amount and inherent risk therein to not be of an equity nature (ie: reliant on 
the profits of the company). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The current taxation of the returns on debt and equity in South 
Africa and the implications for companies and investors 
 
 
The tax consequences of debt and equity are different both for the company and the 
investor. The interest expense on debt is allowed as a deduction under section 24J 
provided inter alia that it is incurred in the production of the income. A creditor in 
relation to interest earned includes the interest income in taxable income (subject to 
certain exemptions). Dividends declared on equity are viewed as a distribution of 
profits and do not allow for a deduction from income. Dividend income received by a 
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shareholder is exempt from normal tax under section 10(1)(k) (subject to certain 
restrictions).   
 
Whilst the commercial attributes, risk profile and return expectations of debt and 
equity differ, they both constitute alternative forms of capital for a company. If one 
takes the view that debt and equity are merely alternative forms of capital for a 
company, both of which are used in the production of income, and both interest and 
dividends are expenses which a company is required to pay for the use of capital 
advanced to it, then any distinction between the return on debt and equity does not 
withstand scrutiny (Boltar, 1996). The reason for the different tax treatment seems to 
originate from the view that interest is a cost to a company, whilst dividends are a 
distribution of profits after all costs, including tax, have been paid.  
 
The different tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity allow taxpayers to 
structure their capital requirements either as debt or equity and choose a tax treatment 
that suits their needs. This can be problematic as taxpayers are able to create financial 
instruments that take the legal form of debt but take on commercial characteristics of 
equity, and vice versa. The Income Tax Act seeks to overcome this by including 
certain sections that re-characterise interest as dividend in specie and dividends as 
income. Sections 8E and 8EA are specific sections targeting certain equity 
instruments with debt-like features. If applicable, these sections re-characterise 
dividend income as normal income in the hands of the holder, thus resulting in such 
amount being taxed in full. Interestingly, the section does not provide for a deduction 
for the issuing company should dividends be re-characterised as income. Further, 
sections 8E and 8EA do not serve to re-characterise dividends as interest but rather as 
income. Dividends affected by sections 8E and 8EA are therefore not impacted by 
sections of the Income Tax Act that specifically apply to interest or dividends as the 
re-characterised income is neither interest nor dividends. Sections 8F and 8FA are 
sections targeting debt instruments with equity-like features. These sections deem 
interest income as dividend in specie where applicable and are taxed accordingly. The 
deduction of the interest is disallowed for the issuing company and the debt holder 
receives an exempt return. Whilst the provisions of sections 8E, 8EA, 8F and 8FA 
(‘Specific Sections’) are technical and extensive, the intention here is to identify 
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which features of the Dixie Dairy Factors the Income Tax Act has identified in 
determining a financial instrument as debt or equity.  
 
Section 8E has two main features being the redemption period and security that have 
a bearing on whether the return on certain shares will be treated as income.  
1. Redemption Period: The obligation on the part of the issuer to redeem a 
share or the option on the part of the holder to have a share redeemed 
within three years from the date of issue of that share will serve to re-
characterise the dividend income as income. Two Dixie Dairy Factors find 
application: 
1. fixed maturity date; and  
2. rights to enforce payments. 
 
2. Security: Any preference share1 that is secured by or subject to an 
arrangement in terms of which a financial instrument
2
 may not be disposed 
of will also serve to re-characterise the return on the shares as income. The 
section includes a proviso that the re-characterisation is not applicable in 
circumstances where the funds derived from the issue of the preference 
shares was used for a so-called qualifying purpose as set out in section 
8EA. The qualifying purpose is discussed further below. This impact of 
security on the classification of debt and equity bears closeness to the 
following Dixie Dairy Factors:  
1. source of payments; 
2. rights to enforce payments; 
3. status in relation to regular corporate creditors; and 
4. risk involved in making advances. 
 
The expectation of repayment for a preference share that benefits from a 
financial instrument as security is expected to be significantly higher and 
                                                 
1
 A preference share is defined in section 8EA: 
“preference share” means any share— 
(a) other than an equity share; or 
(b) that is an equity share, if the amount of any dividend or foreign dividend in respect of that 
share is based on or determined with reference to a specified rate of interest or the time value 
of money; 
 
2
 This refers to the definition of financial instrument in section 8E referred to in Chapter 2. 
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less dependent on the corporate earnings of the company (which is 
characteristic of equity).  
 
Section 8EA re-characterises dividends on so-called third party backed shares as 
income in certain cases. Third party backed shares refer to preference shares that 
benefit from an enforcement right that is enforceable against another party, or that 
other party has an enforcement obligation in relation to that share. Section 8EA 
covers situations where holders of preference shares enter into various other 
agreements linked to the performance of the preference shares with third parties in 
order to mitigate the risk inherent in the issuing company. Section 8EA (and the 
security provision described in section 8E) are not applicable where the proceeds of 
the preference shares are used for a so-called qualifying purpose and the enforcement 
right or enforcement obligation is enforceable against a specified list of persons. A 
qualifying purpose in summary refers to the proceeds of the preference shares being 
used for the direct or indirect acquisition of equity shares. The qualifying purpose also 
allows for the proceeds to be used for the refinancing of debt (and any associated 
interest thereon) or preference shares (and any associated dividends thereon) where 
the proceeds of the original funding was used to directly or indirectly acquire equity 
shares. The following Dixie Dairy Factors have been identified in section 8EA:   
1. source of payments; 
2. rights to enforce payments; 
3. status in relation to regular corporate creditors; 
4. use to which advances were put; and 
5. risk involved in making advances. 
 
It is common for debt providers to require guarantees from other companies within a 
group of companies in order to gain access to the assets and cash flow of the key 
operating companies within a group of companies. Section 8EA seems to address this 
debt-like feature. 
 
Section 8F has three main features being conversion, payment obligation and 
redemption period that have a bearing on whether the interest on debt will be treated 
as a dividend in specie and not deductible for the issuing company.  
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1. Conversion: The obligation or entitlements on the part of the issuing 
company to convert or exchange debt for shares will re-characterise the 
interest on the debt as dividend in specie, and taxed accordingly. This 
provision does not apply where the market value of those shares is equal to 
the amount owed in terms of the debt at the time of the exchange. The 
following Dixie Dairy Factors find application: 
1. rights to enforce payments; 
2. intent of the parties; 
3. failure of the debtor to repay; 
4. risk involved in making advances. 
The ability of a company to extinguish a debt obligation through the 
issuance of shares at a value that does not reflect the capital amount 
advanced under a debt obligation lends itself to equity risk and is not 
reflective of a true debtor-creditor relationship. 
 
2. Payment Obligation: in the event that the obligation of the company to 
pay an amount in respect of a debt is conditional on the market value of 
the assets of the company not being less than the market value of the 
liabilities of the company then the interest on the debt will be re-
characterised as dividend in specie, and taxed accordingly. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the board of directors of a company needs to meet the 
solvency and liquidity requirements as set out in section 46 of the 
Companies Act in order to make any proposed distribution in terms of a 
share. One of the requirements of the solvency and liquidity test is for the 
market value of the assets of the company to exceed the market value of its 
liabilities. A payment obligation under this scenario has a direct link to the 
payment obligation under the return on equity, and is therefore equity-like 
in nature. The following Dixie Dairy Factors find application: 
1. rights to enforce payments; 
2. status in relation to regular corporate creditors;  
3. intent of the parties; and 
4. risk involved in making advances. 
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3. Redemption Period: if the repayment date of a debt instrument is greater 
than 30 years from redemption date then the debt instrument is seen as 
equity-like and the interest income taxed as dividend in specie. Whilst a 
debt with a repayment date of greater than 30 years may still technically 
have a repayment date it can be argued that the repayment is in many ways 
tied to the long term fortunes of the company, reliant on company profits 
and therefore indicative of an equity advance. Three Dixie Dairy Factors 
find application: 
a. fixed maturity date; 
b. intent of the parties; and 
c. risk involved in making advances. 
 
Section 8FA provides that where the interest rate on a debt is not determined with 
some specified rate of interest or time value of money, or the interest rate is increased 
by reference to the profits of the company then that applicable portion will be re-
characterised as dividend in specie, and taxed accordingly. A debt instrument with 
this type of feature bears closeness to the very definition of equity which gives equity 
the right to the remaining profits of the company. Three Dixie Dairy Factors find 
application, as the return on the debt instrument is more in line with what one would 
expect to find with equity. These include: 
1. Source of payments; 
2. Intent of the parties; and 
3. Risk involved in making advances. 
 
The taxation of the returns on debt and equity are clearly very different. The Income 
Tax Act attempts to overcome the ability of taxpayers to structure debt instruments 
with equity features and equity instruments with debt features. Certain aspects of the 
commercial nature of debt and equity as determined by international tax courts have 
found their way into South African tax legislation. It is the writer’s opinion that is it 
unlikely for the South African courts to go beyond the Specific Sections and refer to 
international case law in order to determine the true nature and substance of a 
financial instrument. The Specific Sections have been enacted for this purpose and 
one would expect that the courts refer to the Specific Sections in order to address how 
to deal with these transactions. South African taxpayers therefore only need to refer to 
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the commercial features described in the Specific Sections. The key Dixie Dairy 
Factors that the Income Tax Act focuses on in the Specific Sections are: 
1. Fixed maturity date; 
2. Source of payments; 
3. Rights to enforce payments; 
4. Status in relation to regular corporate creditors;  
5. Intent of the parties; and 
6. Risk involved in making advances. 
 
The implications of the current taxation of the returns on debt and equity is that 
companies and investors are able to structure their affairs in order to either receive an 
exempt return together with no corresponding deduction for the company, or a taxable 
return together with a corresponding deduction for the company, subject to the 
Specific Sections. From an issuing company’s perspective, a debt instrument typically 
makes the most sense provided a tax deduction is allowed on the return on debt. An 
investor would typically be more interested in receiving an exempt return as is the 
case with the return on equity. With the prescriptive nature of the Specific Sections, 
taxpayers may be able to structure debt instruments that retain equity features and / or 
equity instruments that retain debt-like features. Investors may even want a return on 
a debt instrument to be re-classified as a dividend in specie and ensure that the debt 
instrument purposely falls within the scope of sections 8F or 8FA. The result is that 
taxpayers may still be able to structure their affairs where the returns on debt and 
equity do not necessarily conform to the commercial nature of debt or equity. In a 
cross-border context, it may also be that certain instruments qualify for equity or debt 
treatment in South Africa but as debt or equity, respectively, in another jurisdiction. 
The writer’s contention is that the Specific Sections go some way in solving the issue 
of debt and equity not complying with their commercial nature but that they still 
allow for it in some shape or form (as will be expanded on in the next chapter). An 
equal treatment of the returns on debt and equity would remove the issue of debt and 
equity not complying with their commercial nature. 
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Chapter 4: The complications for taxpayers and the South African Revenue 
Service in the sections that limit or re-characterise the returns on debt and 
equity 
 
 
Difficulty in determining debt and equity: 
 
The writer’s view is that the true determination of debt and equity is a difficult task 
particularly where the intention of the parties is a determining factor. The starting 
point is the label of the instrument but one has to consider the true nature and 
substance of the instrument. The inclusion of the Specific Sections into the Income 
Tax Act means that the return on equity or debt instruments will be taxed depending 
on the specific criteria described therein. In the writer’s opinion one need only look at 
the Specific Sections in South African law in order to address the re-characterisation 
of the returns on debt and equity. It remains possible therefore for companies to issue 
equity instruments that retain certain commercial debt features or debt instruments 
that retain certain commercial equity features provided the instruments fall outside of 
the criteria set out in the Specific Sections.  
 
Whilst the label or legal nature of the instrument will not be sufficient for tax 
purposes, the specific situations as described in the Specific Sections are very 
prescriptive and only consider some of the commercial features of debt and equity 
described by the Dixie Dairy Factors. The Specific Sections also serve to re-
charaterise the return on debt and equity based on single factors. The court in the 
Dixie Dairies case noted that each of the Dixie Dairy Factors is not equally 
significant, that no single factor is determinative and that not all of the factors are 
relevant to each case. The complexity of the factors that comprise the commercial 
make-up of debt and equity as compared to the single factors in the Specific Sections 
makes it possible for equity instruments to still maintain various commercial debt 
features and its return not re-characterised accordingly, and vice versa. One single 
factor may also not be enough to re-characterise the nature of an instrument as either 
debt or equity. In substance the remaining factors may be more reflective of a true 
debt or equity instrument. The construct of the Income Tax Act therefore means that 
one could re-characterise the returns of debt and equity when the commercial reality 
does not justify it.  
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The prescriptive nature of the Specific Sections allows taxpayers to create financial 
instruments that purposely fall outside or are affected by the Specific Sections. This is 
illustrated through the following two examples. 
 
Example 1: It is possible to construct an equity instrument with debt features 
that simply fall outside the scope of sections 8E and 8EA. For example a 
preference share transaction with a redemption date of 3 years and 1 month 
(ie: greater than 3 years) will fall outside of the scope of section 8E. The 
principle of redemption however remains in the equity instrument and yet does 
not re-characterise the nature of the return. Similarly, a debt instrument with a 
repayment date of 29 years and 11 months (ie: less than 30 years) could also 
be implemented. It is arguable that the instrument is more equity-like as the 
repayment date is so far in the future. The return maintains its debt nature 
from a tax perspective given that the 30 year requirement in section 8F is not 
met. 
 
Example 2: An investor may wish to invest in an instrument that yields 
income that is exempt whilst the investee company may not wish to issue 
shares or preference shares. The investee company may be able to issue a loan 
and ensure that it includes a feature found in section 8F or 8FA, for example 
the obligation to make an interest payment requires the market value of the 
assets of the company to exceed the market value of the liabilities. The interest 
income on the loan would then be re-characterised as dividend in specie. It 
could be argued that in this case the instrument is in substance still a debt 
instrument as the remaining factors outweigh this single factor, yet the 
company is able to ensure an exempt return through the re-characterisation 
applicable in section 8F. Furthermore, the company is not required to comply 
with all of the requirements as set out in sections 8E and 8EA had it issued 
shares or preference shares, as these sections do not deal with debt 
instruments. 
 
The test for a debt is ultimately to test whether a true debtor-creditor relationship was 
intended. The Specific Sections may serve to capture some of the commercial 
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arrangements that trigger a debt or equity-like instrument but will never in the writer’s 
opinion be able to fully capture the intention of the parties entering into a financing 
transaction. The analysis is not meant as a criticism of the Specific Sections but rather 
intended to illustrate the practical difficulties in drafting the various commercial 
aspects of debt and equity. It is very difficult to include all the features that make-up 
the commercial features of debt and equity as described by the Dixie Dairy Factors, 
especially given that not all the features are always relevant in each case, and that the 
surrounding facts and circumstances need to be considered.  
 
The result of the above is that the intention of the Specific Sections could be defeated 
given that not all of the commercial features of debt and equity can, in the opinion of 
the writer, be drafted into legislation. In addition, with the prescriptive nature of the 
Specific Sections, it remains possible to structure financial instruments to fall outside 
or purposely into the Specific Sections and not be impacted, or may purposely be 
impacted, by the legislation. 
 
 
Inconsistency in determining debt and equity: 
 
The Specific Sections consider different commercial factors for sections 8E and 8EA 
as compared to sections 8F and 8FA. Where similar commercial factors are 
considered, the requirements are different. Section 8E has the fixed maturity date and 
security as its two debt-like characteristics. Section 8EA considers support provided 
from third parties as its debt characteristic. Section 8F has the convertibility of debt 
into equity, the obligation to repay the debt and the fixed maturity date as its factors. 
Sections 8FA has a reference to a capped interest rate with reference to the time value 
of money as its commercial factor of debt. 
 
There are two factors that apply to both 8E and 8EA, and 8F and 8FA. The first is a 
capped return that references an interest rate or time value of money. This concept has 
been incorporated into the definitions of a ‘hybrid equity instrument’ in section 8E 
and definition of ‘preference share’ in section 8EA. This concept is also present in the 
definition of ‘hybrid interest’ in section 8FA. The other factor that has been 
consistently applied is the redemption period of the instrument. The concept of a 
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redemption period is included in the definition of ‘hybrid equity instrument’ in 
section 8E and refers to a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Three years is 
therefore the critical date for the Income Tax Act whereby equity ‘crosses the 
rubicon’ and its return taxed like the return on debt. The redemption period is 
included in the definition of ‘hybrid debt instrument’ in section 8F and refers to a 
period of 30 years from the date of issue. The determination for debt to be reclassified 
as equity is therefore set at 30 years. Any instrument that has a redemption date of 
less than 3 years from the issue date is therefore clearly debt-like, whilst any 
instrument that has a redemption date of greater than 30 years from issue date, is 
clearly equity-like, for the Income Tax Act. A redemption date between 3 years and 
30 years remains unaffected by the Specific Sections and provide no guidance as to its 
nature. 
 
The writer is of the view that a section that sets out a consistent set of parameters for 
both debt and equity would be more helpful for taxpayers should a different tax 
treatment on the return on debt and equity be the preferred approach. 
 
 
Funding of Equity 
 
The Income Tax Act requires, inter alia, in terms of section 11(a) that expenditure 
and losses are to be incurred in the production of the income, as part of the general 
deduction formula, in order to qualify for a deduction.  
Income is defined in section 1 as follows:  
“income” means the amount remaining of the gross income of any person for any 
year or period of assessment after deducting there from any amounts exempt from 
normal tax under Part I of Chapter II; 
 
Dividends are exempt from normal tax (subject to certain restrictions) under section 
10(1)(k)
3
 and do not form part of income as defined. Companies that wish to fund the 
acquisition of shares with the use of debt will not be able to claim the interest 
                                                 
3
 10. Exemptions. – (1) There shall be exempt from normal tax –  
…  
(k) (i) dividend (other than dividends paid or declared by a head quarter company) received by or 
accrued to any person… 
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expenditure as a tax deduction in the ordinary course. On the other hand the lender 
will be taxed on the interest income earned.  
 
Section 24O does deem interest to be in the production of income if the company uses 
the proceeds of the debt to acquire equity shares but only in instances where the 
acquiring company becomes a controlling group company (>70% ownership) in 
relation to the acquired company. The deduction for interest paid or incurred in 
respect of the debt is limited in terms of section 23N to: 
 40 per cent of the debtor’s taxable income (before taking into account interest 
received or accrued and interest paid or incurred); plus 
 Interest received or accrued; less 
 Interest paid or incurred in respect of debt falling outside the limitation. 
Whilst section 24O is helpful for taxpayers, it has its limitations and only applies in 
certain circumstances described above. Companies in South Africa therefore find debt 
funding to be an inefficient form of funding to acquire shares from a tax perspective 
where section 24O cannot be used to claim a deduction for interest paid or incurred. 
 
It makes sense for the acquisition of shares to be funded with equity as the inability to 
deduct the interest is matched with an exempt return for the investor. A well-
established preference share market has developed in South Africa and is often used 
in situations where the issuer of the preference shares uses the funds to acquire equity 
shares. A preference share is defined in section 8EA as follows: 
 “preference share” means any share— 
(a) other than an equity share; or 
(b) that is an equity share, if an amount of any dividend or foreign dividend in result of 
that share is based on or determined with reference to a specified rate of interest or 
the time value of money; 
 
An equity share is defined in section 1 as follows: 
 “equity share” means any share in a company, excluding any share that, neither as 
respects dividends nor as returns of capital, carried any right to participate beyond a 
specified amount in a distribution; 
 
A preference share as defined is therefore a share where a limitation is placed on the 
dividend or return of capital from that share or where the dividend or foreign dividend 
makes reference to a specified rate of interest or the time value of money. Preference 
shares as defined are therefore very clearly debt-like equity instruments. 
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Preference shares can be used as an alternative form of financing in instances where a 
company wishes to acquire equity shares. As the instrument yields an exempt 
dividend, the mismatch of non-deductibility for the issuer and taxation of the interest 
for the investor is avoided. The exempt nature of the dividend would typically also 
mean that the investor is able to accept a lower return. Preference shares are often 
redeemable in nature which is a further feature of debt. Investors often wish to 
improve the credit position of preference shares, as one would expect with debt. This 
is often done by the investor entering into certain security arrangements and / or 
benefiting from guarantees from other group companies or the right to put the 
preference shares to another group company in certain situations. It is arguable that 
the risk of these preference shares is therefore more akin to debt than to equity. 
 
Sections 8E and 8EA allow for equity instruments to have debt-like features in 
circumstances where the proceeds are used to acquire equity shares in operating 
companies, or to refinance debt (and any associated interest thereon) or preference 
shares (and any associated dividends thereon) that were originally used to acquire 
shares in an operating company. The requirement for interest to be in the production 
of income in order to qualify for a deduction and the different tax treatment of debt 
and equity has in the writer’s opinion exacerbated the need for equity with debt-like 
features in South Africa. The purpose of preference shares is therefore critical when 
the investor is looking to improve the credit position of the preference shares.  
 
It is interesting and problematic that the issuing company’s purpose in terms of the 
‘qualifying purpose’ affects the tax nature of the returns on the preference shares in 
the hands of the holder. The purpose to which the issuer used the funds is not within 
the control of the holder, and can create complications particularly given that sections 
8E and 8EA are very technical in nature and subject to interpretation. There may be 
instances where the technical wording of the legislation may not conform to the 
perceived intention of the legislation.  
 
In summary, it is the writer’s contention that the construct of the current Income Tax 
Act exacerbates the need for debt-like equity instruments in order to overcome the 
non-deducibility of interest by issuing debt to fund the acquisition of equity. The 
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various security positions, exclusions and interpretation needed for the sections 8E 
and 8EA makes for a complicated tax system. 
 
 
Leverage and Debt Profit Shifting 
 
The deductibility of interest on debt can create distortion in the financing decisions of 
companies. Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2012) identify two types of 
economic distortions, being the shifting of taxable profits from one jurisdiction to 
another through the use of interest on debt (described as debt profit shifting) and 
excessive use of debt.  
 
The deductibility of interest creates opportunities to shift and decrease taxable income 
via debt-shifting arrangements and the use of hybrid instruments. The different tax 
treatment of the returns on debt and equity creates opportunities for companies and 
investors to either keep the tax base in the company through the use of equity or shift 
the tax base from the company to the investor through the use of debt. This is most 
relevant amongst companies that form part of the same economic unit and in 
international situations where the borrower is in a high tax jurisdiction and the 
investor is in a low tax jurisdiction (de Mooij, 2011). Even outside the cross-border 
group company context, the deductibility of interest creates the incentive for 
companies to use debt financing. Interest is typically payable regardless of the 
profitability of the company and can add financial distress on a company and 
ultimately add to systemic risk of a country (de Mooij, 2011). The different tax 
treatment of the returns on debt and equity can create the incentive for poorly 
capitalised companies which in turn can increase systemic risk. 
 
The National Treasury published a request for public comment in April 2013 for 
incorporation in the 2013 Tax Laws Amendment Bill for proposed limitations against 
excessive interest tax deductions in April 2013. The background commentary 
summarises National Treasury’s concerns on interest deductibility: 
Over the past several years, tax schemes by some corporates have become an increasing 
concern locally as well as globally. The recent OECD paper notes that “while there are 
many ways in which domestic tax bases can be eroded, a significant source of base 
erosion is profit shifting”. One of the most significant types of base erosion in South 
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Africa comes in the form of excessive deductions by some corporates with income 
effectively shifted to a no-tax or low-tax jurisdiction or converted to a different type of 
income in another jurisdiction.  These deductions are typically channeled as interest, 
royalties, service fees and insurance premiums. Of greatest concern is excessive 
deductible interest (writer’s emphasis). In terms of excessive deductible interest, 
Government has identified four recurring concerns:  
 
1. Hybrid Debt:  Hybrid debt instruments essentially involve instruments with the 
label of debt but with substantive features being more indicative of shares 
(equity).  These instruments are typically labeled as debt in South Africa so that 
payments are deductible. However, these instruments are often labeled as equity 
in the other jurisdiction so as to benefit from cross-border arbitrage. Most of 
these instruments would otherwise be labeled as shares if tax were not a 
consideration.  
 
2. Connected person debt:  The relationship between creditor and debtor often 
becomes blurred once both parties form part of the same economic unit.  This 
situation often arises when a parent company lends money to a wholly owned 
subsidiary. In this situation, the terms of the instrument are somewhat irrelevant 
because both parties can change the terms at will to serve the overall interests of 
the group. As a result, the debt label for instruments in these circumstances is 
often driven by tax and other regulatory factors; whereas, the payments often 
represent substantive capital contributions to be repaid only if the subsidiary at 
issue is profitable. 
 
3. Transfer pricing:  In a cross-border context, excessive interest can arise if the 
interest yield is driven by tax considerations as opposed to arm’s length 
commercial reasons, especially if the debtor and creditor are connected persons.   
Also of concern is “lending” that would not arise in a commercial context.  In 
these cases, transfer pricing adjustments can be used to eliminate debt with 
excessive interest or excessive debt. 
 
4. Acquisition debt: While the need to obtain debt financing for acquisitions is well 
understood, excessive debt becomes problematic because excessive debt (or over 
gearing) is often anchored on the expectation that the interest will be paid from 
future profits.  If allowed to extremes, the interest on the debt often eliminates 
taxable profits for years to come.  Acquisition debt of greatest concern is 
mezzanine and subordinated debt (i.e. debt containing an escalating number of 
equity features).  Besides tax concerns, excessive debt gives rise to governance 
concerns with the excessive debt creating excessive risk (as a number of entities 
and economies have “painfully” discovered in recent years). 
 
The Income Tax Act introduced sections 8F and 8FA in order to cover the concern 
raised by hybrid debt instruments. Section 23K was effective until 31 March 2014 and 
limited the interest deduction in respect of debt used for a group reorganisation 
transaction or an acquisition transaction as defined. The section provided that no 
deduction was allowed in respect of interest incurred for debt used for an acquisition 
in terms of a reorganistion transaction as defined in section 23K or for the purpose of 
the acquisition of an equity share in a company in terms of section 24O. The 
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acquiring company was able to seek a directive from the Commissioner
4
 stating that 
the deduction of the interest was allowed.  
 
Section 23K was replaced with a more formulaic limitation of interest deductions in 
respect of reorganistion and acquisition transactions described above. This is set out 
in section 23N (effective 1 April 2014) and covers the concern raised through the use 
of acquisition debt. Section 23M (effective 1 January 2015) relies on the same 
formulae and applies to interest deductions in respect of debts owed to persons not 
subject to South African tax in terms of chapter 2 of the Income Tax Act. This covers 
the concern on connected person debt and transfer pricing. Whilst section 23K has its 
advantages in that the Commissioner could examine the entire transaction and all the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, it was not practical for taxpayers seeking debt-
financing when attempting to acquire control of companies. National Treasury stated 
that deal making of this nature needs clear guidelines when seeking finance before 
core negotiations can be undertaken (National Treasury, 2013). The deduction for 
interest paid or incurred in respect of the debt is limited in terms of sections 23M and 
23N to: 
 40 per cent of the debtor’s taxable income (before taking into account interest 
received or accrued and interest paid or incurred); plus 
 Interest received or accrued; less 
 Interest paid or incurred in respect of debt falling outside the limitation. 
 
The legislation required to combat the various concerns comes as a direct result of the 
deductibility of interest, whilst the same deduction is not afforded to dividends. The 
sections are relevant where debt is used in circumstances where the National Treasury 
believe that equity should be the correct instrument or where the amount of debt is 
deemed to be excessive. The deductibility of the return on debt as compared to the 
return on equity can therefore create a riskier economic system through the increased 
use of debt increasing the systemic risk in the economy. The need for all the various 
                                                 
4
 Commissioner is defined in section 1 as: 
“Commissioner” means the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service appointed 
in terms of section 6 of the South African Revenue Service Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 1997), or 
the Acting Commissioner designated in terms of section 7 the that Act. 
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pieces of legislation required to combat the use of leverage, creates in the writer’s 
opinion, a more complicated taxation system. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Alternatives to the different tax treatment of the returns on debt and 
equity 
 
The different tax treatment of debt and equity leads to a complicated financial system 
particularly in the case of hybrid instruments that have commercial features of both 
debt and equity. If one takes the view that debt and equity are merely alternative 
forms of funding with different risk and return profiles, then a different tax treatment 
is difficult to justify. The writer is of the view that debt and equity serve to separate a 
company’s capital structure into tranches. Debt has a senior-ranking claim with a 
return that is commensurate with the risk. Equity has a subordinated claim and is 
exposed to all of the residual risk and profits of the company. De Mooij (2012) states 
that the original rationale to allow a deduction for only debt namely that interest is a 
cost of doing business and equity returns reflect business income, makes no sense 
economically. He states that ‘in economic terms, both payments represent a return to 
capital and there is no a priori reason to tax one differently from the other’ (De Mooij, 
2012). With the difficulties of an unequal tax treatment of the returns on debt and 
equity, together with no compelling economic reason as to why this should be the 
case, then an equal tax treatment of debt and equity should be seriously considered. 
 
Two major reform proposals namely the comprehensive business income tax and the 
allowance for corporate equity have been developed internationally to deal with the 
issue. The US Treasury proposed the comprehensive business income tax in 1992 
whilst the Capital Taxes Committee of the Institute for Fiscal Studies elaborated the 
allowance for corporate equity system in 1991 after originally being advanced by 
Boadway and Bruce in 1984 (Devereux and Freeman, 1991). The comprehensive 
business income tax provides that neither interest nor a return on equity may be 
deducted. In other words the return on debt is treated like the return on equity from a 
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tax perspective. The allowance for corporate equity provides for, besides the 
deduction of debt interest, also for the deduction of an imputed return on equity from 
the profit tax base (Bond, 2000). The tax treatment on the return on equity therefore 
bears a closer resemblance to the tax treatment on the return on debt. Both models are 
focused on increasing neutrality with regard to the investment and financial decisions 
of companies and to reduce the distortions in the existing tax system. An alternative to 
the allowance for corporate equity is to allow for a deduction of all dividends paid 
together with a corresponding taxation of dividends in the hands of the holder. The 
comprehensive business income tax, allowance for corporate equity and a deduction 
of dividends will be considered as alternatives to the existing tax system. 
 
 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
 
The comprehensive business income tax (‘CBIT’) seeks to eliminate the incentive for 
debt-financed investment by disallowing a deduction for interest payments (Mooij 
and Devereux, 2009). The neutrality between debt and equity is achieved by treating 
the returns on debt like the returns on equity from a tax perspective. In order to avoid 
double taxation an exemption or credit should also be provided for interest earned.   
 
The comprehensive business income tax model serves to simplify the taxation of debt 
and equity. With an equal treatment of the returns on debt and equity the Specific 
Sections would become irrelevant and could therefore be repealed. Concerns of thin 
capitalisation and debt profit shifting would also be removed as the incentive to use 
debt for interest deductibility purposes would no longer apply. One would expect 
companies to make use of debt and equity instruments for the commercial purposes 
for which they were intended and not be swayed by the different tax consequences of 
each. The incentive to use hybrid instruments (specifically debt instruments with 
equity-like features) would decrease as the tax advantage of debt is eliminated. One 
would expect better capitalised companies leading to a more stable financial system 
with reduced systemic risk. The comprehensive business income tax therefore has 
many positive benefits. 
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There are no real-world experiments of actual CBIT regimes. Yet, countries have 
imposed reforms that limit the deductibility of interest in some way, usually through 
thin-capitalisation rules (Mooij and Devereux, 2009). Sections 8F, 8FA, 23K, 23M 
and 23N are examples where this has been introduced in South Africa. The South 
African legislation therefore has some features contained in the comprehensive 
business income tax model but as stated earlier, is ultimately intended to cover 
situations where debt instruments have equity characteristics or excessive debt is 
used. The sections described above therefore cover specific concerns and fall short of 
the implications of a full comprehensive business income tax which would effectively 
eliminate the need for the sections described above altogether. 
 
The comprehensive business income tax is a broad based tax on capital at the level of 
the firm (Mooij and Devereux, 2009). The model raises the cost of capital on debt-
financed investments and broadens the tax base. With companies being responsible 
for a significant portion of economic activity, an increase in the cost of investment 
could have a materially negative impact on economic growth as fewer investment 
decisions become profitable. The widening of the tax base means that the corporate 
tax rate could potentially be reduced and could mitigate some of the effects of the 
comprehensive business income tax. Sorenson (2007) states that on balance the cost 
of capital for low yielding investments financed by debt is likely to rise, leading to 
lower investments. The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2014 states that one 
of the challenges of the South African government is to encourage greater private-
sector investment in the economy.  It was stated that ‘removing obstacles to private 
investment must be a priority for government at all levels’ (Medium Term Budget 
Policy Statement, 2014). New ventures may yield marginal returns for a number of 
years before they become more profitable. The comprehensive business income tax 
benefits companies that are profitable and arguably at a time when less tax relief is 
needed. The comprehensive business income tax is therefore in contrast to the 
objectives of the National Treasury. 
 
The comprehensive business income tax is a diversion from the economic cost of 
financing investment. Interest is an economic cost of capital necessary to fund 
investment and is currently deductible in terms of the general deduction formula. A 
model that disallows interest as an economic cost may serve to neutralise and thereby 
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simplify some features of the tax treatment of the returns on debt and equity, but is 
not reflective of the true economic cost of borrowing. Introducing economic 
distortions into the tax system does not, in the writer’s opinion, improve the taxation 
of the returns on debt and equity. The distortions of the comprehensive business 
income tax can be illustrated by the following example: 
 
Current CBIT 1 CBIT 2  
1000 1000 1500 Profit Before Interest and Taxes 
-200 -200 -200 Interest 
800 800 1300 Profit Before Tax 
-224 -280 -420 Tax (28%) 
576 520 880 Profit After Tax 
28% 35% 32% Effective Tax Rate (Tax / Profit Before Tax) 
 
‘Current’ refers to a hypothetical company that is taxed under existing legislation, 
specifically where the interest charged is allowed as a deduction. ‘CBIT 1’ refers to 
the same company that is taxed under the comprehensive business income tax (ie: 
where no deduction is allowed for interest). ‘CBIT 2’ refers to another more 
profitable company taxed under the comprehensive business income tax (ie: where no 
deduction is allowed for interest).  
 
The example illustrates how the effective tax rate of a company increases as a result 
of the comprehensive business income tax. This is depicted by the effective tax rate 
for CBIT 1 being higher than Current. The example also shows the volatility of the 
effective tax rate of companies under the comprehensive business income tax for 
different levels of profitability as the effective tax rate is lower under CBIT 2 than 
CBIT 1. The example shows how the comprehensive business income tax benefits 
more profitable businesses. Highly profitable investments financed by equity will be 
taxed lighter so that these investments will expand. The comprehensive business 
income tax will therefore serve to lower the effective tax rate on already profitable 
business and increase the effective tax rate on lower yielding investments (Sorenson, 
2007). Whilst the current tax system may be prejudicial to equity financed companies, 
the comprehensive business income tax prejudices marginal investments that are 
funded with debt. 
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It is likely that the comprehensive business income tax model could be seen as an 
obstacle to private investment and met with resistance in South Africa. The 
introduction of economic distortions brought about by the comprehensive business 
income tax would not in the writer’s opinion improve the taxation of the returns on 
debt and equity in South Africa. The implementation of the comprehensive business 
income tax in its entirety in South Africa seems unlikely when considering the 
objectives of the National Treasury.  
 
 
Allowance for Corporate Equity 
 
Allowance for corporate equity attempts to obtain neutrality between debt and equity 
by allowing for a notional interest deduction on the book value of equity. Isaacs 
(1997) summarised equity for this purpose as: 
 shareholders’ funds for the previous period (if any), plus 
 any new equity contributed, plus 
 any allowance for corporate equity for the previous period, plus 
 any taxable profits for the previous period, plus 
 dividends received and amounts realised in disposals of other companies’ 
shares, 
less 
 the tax paid on those profits, plus 
 dividends and distributions to shareholders and capital repaid, plus 
 amounts invested in the share capital of other companies.  
 
IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991) stated that ‘the amount of the allowance in any 
period will be calculated by reference to a normal commercial rate of interest, fixed 
by the government and based on the current rate for medium-dated gilts’. 
 
The allowance of corporate equity is a tax on economic rents as no tax is levied on 
projects with a return that matches the cost of capital (Mooij and Devereux, 2009). To 
the extent that the allowance for corporate equity represents a company’s required 
rate of return, there should be the beneficial effect that a marginal investment would 
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not be deterred by the tax (Isaacs, 1997). The model serves to reduce the cost of 
capital and increase the profitability of an investment, particularly for marginal and 
asset intensive projects.  
 
IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991) stated that ‘the obvious result of such a reform, so far 
as the company is concerned, is that it is largely unconcerned as to whether it finances 
itself by raising debt or equity or through retained profits. In any case, the normal rate 
of return on such capital (as represented by the rate fixed by the government for 
equity capital or retained profits and by the actual interest rate paid on its debt) is 
effectively exempt from tax and is taxable only at the personal level.’ 
 
Klemm (2007) provides for the following list of advantages of the allowance for 
corporate equity (provided that the correct notional interest rate is chosen). 
 Neutrality for financing choices. Firms will be indifferent to debt or equity 
finance, at least regarding the corporate tax implications. 
 Neutrality to investment. No tax is charged on marginal projects, as for such 
projects the notional return will exactly match the pre-tax profits. Hence any 
investment that would be worthwhile in the absence of tax remains worthwhile 
when taxed. 
 Method of tax depreciation is irrelevant. Any increase in depreciation in 
early years, will reduce the stock of equity and hence the allowance for 
corporate equity in later years, which exactly offsets in net present value terms 
any benefit from earlier depreciation. 
 Unaffected by inflation. Any increase in monetary profits that is due to 
inflation will be offset by a higher notional return, as the notional interest rate 
will also be higher as a result of inflation. Indexation is therefore unnecessary. 
 
Klemm (2007) provides for the following disadvantages of the system: 
 Higher corporate tax rate. Because of the narrower tax base, a higher tax 
rate needs to be set if the same amount of revenue is to be collected. This 
could be harmful in the presence of tax competition for mobile economic 
rents. 
 36 
 Doubtful double tax relief. There may be doubts as to whether other 
countries will accept corporate tax payments under an allowance for corporate 
equity system. 
 
A major drawback of the allowance for corporate equity (for the National Treasury’s 
perspective) is a reduction in the corporate tax base and resultant corporate tax 
revenue. The allowance for corporate equity does not specifically call for the taxation 
of the returns on equity in the hands of the holder in order to counter the erosion of 
the tax base. The loss in corporate tax revenue could be overcome through an increase 
in the corporate tax rate but this too may lead to unfavourable outcomes. Higher 
corporate tax bases would make a country less attractive environment for investment 
especially in a global environment where economic rents can be shifted to offshore 
jurisdictions (Mooij and Devereux, 2009). 
 
An allowance for corporate equity system with an increased tax rate would favour 
capital intensive projects with high asset bases and discriminate against highly 
profitable projects with lower asset values. Isaacs (1997) states that the allowance for 
corporate equity ‘would radically redistribute the burden of taxation between different 
companies — those earning below the average return on capital gaining and those 
with a higher rate of return losing. For better or worse, however, the broad pattern is 
clear, with the more successful companies suffering a tax increase and the less 
successful enjoying a tax reduction.’ Highly profitable businesses would therefore 
effectively be subsidising the reduction in tax paid by less profitable ones which is 
more consistent with the progressive income tax system applicable to natural persons. 
 
The applicable rate of the notional interest deduction on the book value of equity for 
the allowance for corporate equity should be considered in the context of achieving 
neutrality between the use of debt and equity. Bond and Devereux (1995) suggest that 
the appropriate notional return of the allowance for corporate equity should be the 
risk-free nominal interest rate, as the tax advantage is certain. The writer is of the 
view that the appropriate notional return should be the cost of debt for the company in 
the case where neutrality of the return on debt and equity is the primary goal. A rate 
that is less than that would mean that the tax benefits of debt would still be higher 
than equity for the issuing company, despite it being reduced. A notional return for 
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the allowance for corporate equity that is higher than debt would mean that the tax 
benefits for a company of using equity are higher than that of debt. If the ultimate 
intention of the allowance for corporate equity is to create neutrality between debt and 
equity and for companies to not be swayed by the tax treatment of the returns on each, 
then an equal rate needs to be applied to both debt and equity in order to determine 
the allowance to be granted. 
 
There have been various countries that have experimented with an allowance for 
corporate equity. Italy, Croatia and Austria all implemented the allowance for 
corporate equity or models that draw on the principles found in allowance for 
corporate equity but have subsequently all abolished the system. Brazil and Belgium 
are currently the only two countries that implement an allowance for corporate equity 
type system.  
 
Brazil applies a variant of the allowance for corporate equity whereby a so-called 
remuneration of equity can be paid as interest and be deducted at the corporate level. 
The remuneration applies to distributed profits only and applies to the book value of 
equity with a rate equal to that on long-term loans (Mooij and Devereux, 2009). The 
empirical evidence of Klemm (2007) had the following three key findings: 
1. a small reduction in debt; 
2. an increased dividend payout of companies; and 
3. ambiguous results on the impact on the level of investment. 
 
Belgium introduced an allowance for corporate equity system in 2006. The so-called 
notional interest deduction applies to all companies subject to Belgian corporate tax to 
deduct from their income a fictitious interest calculated on the basis of their 
shareholder’s equity (net assets).  The main purpose of the measure was to reduce the 
tax discrimination between debt and equity. The rules were stated to have the 
following positive effects: 
1. A general reduction of the effective corporate tax rate for all companies, and a 
higher return after tax on investment 
2. The promotion of capital-intensive investments in Belgium, and an incentive for 
multinationals to examine the possibility of allocating such activities as intra-
group financing, central procurement and factoring to a Belgian group entity. 
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Kestens, Cauwenberge and Christiaens (2012) investigated whether changes in the 
debt ratios of Belgian small and medium-sized enterprises reflect changes in tax 
incentives induced by the notional interest deduction, up to three years after its 
introduction. To measure the tax incentives of the notional interest deduction, they 
incorporated the notional interest deduction into a simulation procedure of marginal 
tax rates. The result was that 1) the notional interest deduction caused a significant 
decline in the average simulated marginal tax rates and 2) the change in simulated 
marginal tax rates due to the introduction of the notional interest deduction was 
significant in explaining the change in debt ratios. 
 
 
The ability to achieve neutrality between debt and equity through an equal treatment 
of the returns on debt and equity through the allowance for corporate equity model 
has its advantages and disadvantages. In the writer’s opinion, the allowance for 
corporate equity model is a better model from an economic standpoint than the 
existing South African tax system and the corporate business income tax model. The 
model is more reflective of the economic cost of capital as both debt and equity have 
a cost necessary to attract capital. This is true regardless of the commercial nature and 
return expectations of debt and equity. Whilst many countries that introduced the 
allowance for corporate equity have subsequently abolished it, Belgium is still using 
the system today and Brazil is using a variant thereof. 
 
 
Tax Deduction for Dividends 
 
A further alternative to the comprehensive business income tax and the allowance for 
corporate equity is to allow for a deduction of all dividends paid together with a 
corresponding taxation of dividends in the hands of the holder. The system would 
mean that dividends are essentially treated as interest, ensuring neutrality between 
debt and equity financing. This system results in a tax on all undistributed profits of a 
company (Boltar, 1996). The burden of income tax is shifted from the company to the 
equity holder and only remaining income is taxed at the company level. The 
introduction of such a system is closely aligned to the general deduction formula. It is 
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arguable that dividends are expenditure, actually incurred, during a year of 
assessment, in the production of the income, not of a capital nature and laid out for 
the purposes of trade. The requirements of the general deduction formula are therefore 
met. A return on equity is equally required as a return on debt in order to attract 
investors and there is no compelling reason as to why it should be treated differently.  
 
A tax deduction for dividends discriminates against firms that wish to use profits to 
finance future investment and creates the incentive for companies that pay dividends. 
In this regard, the allowance for corporate equity is a better tax as all companies 
benefit equally for its equity capital regardless of its dividend policy. The tax 
deduction for dividends on the other hand creates a much simpler system to regulate 
and is less costly to the fiscus. A deduction of a notional interest rate on equity under 
the allowance for corporate equity model, without a corresponding inclusion of the 
notional interest rate on equity in the hands of the equity holders, means that tax 
revenue is significantly reduced. A tax deduction for dividends for the issuer should 
provide for the taxation of dividends paid for the holder. The fiscus is therefore 
arguably no worse off by allowing for a tax deduction for dividends as the burden of 
tax is simply shifted from the company level to the equity holder for the return on the 
equity. 
 
One of the potential benefits achieved through the neutrality of the returns on debt 
and equity is that the incentive for debt financing is reduced, thereby reducing 
systemic risk with better capitalised companies. One may argue that a deduction of 
dividends creates the incentive for companies to distribute profits to shareholders 
through dividend payments and that this too leads to poorly capitalised companies. 
Whilst this incentive may exist, the fact that the directors of a company need to pass 
the solvency and liquidity requirements as set out in section 46 in the Companies Act 
together with the fact that directors of a company are not obligated to pay dividends, 
counters this risk. A tax deduction for dividends should therefore reduce the systemic 
risk as compared to the current model. 
 
 
 
 
 40 
Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
The different tax treatment on the returns on debt and equity is an international 
system and seems to originate from the view that interest paid on debt is an expense 
to a company whereas dividends represent a distribution of after tax profits. 
Dividends are exempt as the income has already been taxed at the corporate level. 
This paper serves to highlight some of the difficulties that the different tax treatment 
of the returns on debt and equity creates. The issue becomes particularly pronounced 
in the case of hybrid instruments where commercial features of debt and equity are 
present. The different tax treatment on the returns of debt and equity creates the need 
to look at the commercial nature of debt and equity and the need for the Income Tax 
Act to incorporate a host of legislation to counter potential abuse of the South African 
tax base and limit excessive interest deductibility. The Specific Sections introduced 
into the Income Tax Act have been compared to the Dixie Dairy Factors in so far as 
the commercial attributes of debt and equity are concerned. Whilst the Specific 
Sections go some way to overcome the issues associated with the difference tax 
treatment on the returns on debt and equity, there remains significant scope for 
commercial attributes of debt to be incorporated into equity instruments and vice 
versa. The need for the Specific Sections together with sections 23M, 23N and 24O 
add an additional layer of complexity into the South African tax system. The amount 
of amendments to the Specific Sections to counter all these various concerns clearly 
takes a significant amount of time all of which could be eliminated through an equal 
treatment of the returns on debt and equity. 
 
In the writer’s opinion, the current view of interest on debt as a cost of business and 
equity as a distribution of profits should be challenged. Both debt and equity are 
alternative forms of financing for a company with different commercial expectations 
of risk and return associated to each. This in itself is not a good reason for a different 
tax treatment on the returns that they generate. It is arguable that dividends meet the 
requirements of the general deduction formula, as they are expenditure, actually 
incurred, during a year of assessment, in the production of the income, not of a capital 
nature and laid out for the purposes of trade.  
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An equal treatment of the returns on debt and equity can be achieved through treating 
the return on debt more like the return on equity. This is achieved by disallowing a 
deduction for interest as proposed by the comprehensive business income tax system. 
Alternatively the return on equity can be treated more like the return on debt by either 
allowing for a notional interest rate on the book value of equity, as is the case with the 
allowance for corporate equity, or providing for a deduction for dividends. The 
allowance for corporate equity has a broader application and has the beneficial aspect 
of applying regardless of whether a company chooses to pay dividends or not. A tax 
deduction for dividends applies to dividends paid only and is similar to the tax system 
in Brazil where a portion of dividends up to the level of the notional return are treated 
as interest and taxed accordingly. 
 
There are no real world examples of the comprehensive business income tax. The 
system is described as a tax on the capital of the firm. The disallowance of interest 
under the comprehensive business income tax system is in the opinion of the writer a 
move in the wrong direction despite neutrality being achieved on the returns on debt 
and equity. The system is a diversion from economic reality as interest is an economic 
cost of issuing debt and should be taken into consideration. The system prejudices 
against marginal investments and would, in the writer’s opinion, act as a deterrent to 
investment in South Africa. 
 
The allowance for corporate equity and a tax deduction on dividends are better 
taxation systems. Both systems are more reflective of economic reality as both 
interest and dividends are costs incurred by companies in order to produce income. It 
is the writer’s view that a system that allows for a deduction of dividends is the most 
appropriate model in South Africa. The cost to the fiscus is expected to be small as all 
deductions for dividends allowed at the company level are countered with the taxation 
thereof at the equity holder level. It is the return on debt and equity actually received 
that creates the complications created by a different tax treatment on the returns on 
debt and equity. A model that focuses on the dividends paid is therefore more 
appropriate, rather than allowing for a fictitious notional interest deduction on the 
book value of equity. The allowance for corporate equity remains a viable model but 
is not as comprehensive as a model that allows for the deduction of dividends alone.  
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A full review of the challenges to implementing a change of the taxation system is 
beyond the scope of this paper but is expected to be met with some opposition. The 
current taxation of the returns on debt and equity is an international system and 
deviating from this model is expected to bring about much concern. Isaac (1997) 
states that ‘even in the fullness of “ripe time”, it remains true that changes in the tax 
system are very costly — for both administrators and taxpayers — so that both sides 
are rightly careful to satisfy themselves that the net benefits of a proposed tax reform 
will be large enough and robust enough to outweigh the costs of the transition.’ A 
transition to an equal treatment of the returns on debt and equity is ultimately a policy 
decision for the National Treasury. 
 
In summary, the returns on debt and equity could be simplified through an equal 
treatment of both. The comprehensive income tax system would however in the 
opinion of the writer not be an improvement.  The allowance for corporate equity and 
a deduction for dividends would in the writer’s opinion improve the existing taxation 
of the returns on debt and equity, and of these two a deduction for dividends is 
preferred. The implementation of such a system is expected to be met with resistance 
given the substantial deviation from international practice. Comfort is however taken 
from the fact that Belgium has implemented an allowance for corporate equity and 
Brazil a form thereof which restricts the deduction to the amount of the dividends 
paid. It may be worth a review by the National Treasury to consider an equal 
treatment of the returns on debt and equity through the allowance for corporate equity 
or allowing for a deduction on dividends. 
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